

Cultural Assessments and Campaign Planning

**A Monograph
by
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United States Army**



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Campaign planning for major operations including Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) continues to be a challenge for the United States military. This monograph proposes that a major deficiency in current Joint doctrine is the failure to conduct cultural assessment of population groups in an area of operations and to integrate these results into the campaign planning process. Cultural assessment, as defined in this monograph, is a detailed analysis of factors that influence cultural behavior and a summary of the characteristics of that culture of a given population in relation to proposed military operations. The monograph is framed around a series of questions. First, is there a need for cultural assessments in the campaign process? A brief survey of history supports the need for cultural understanding. By examining case studies of actions in Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti and Operation Iraqi Freedom, history demonstrates that the United States either misunderstood or did not appropriately consider cultural aspects in planning campaigns. Numerous academic and literary sources such as Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, Ralph Peters, and Eric Hoffer have provided theoretical models regarding culture. Many of the latest paradigms for defining the nature of warfare stress the need for understanding the cultural aspects of conflict. Second, having established the need for cultural assessments, does doctrine provide guidance, direction and techniques for conducting these assessments? Current Joint doctrine for campaign planning is examined to determine if the processes prescribed meet the requirements of current and future potential warfare. The result of this examination indicates that while Joint doctrine mentions cultural considerations in several references, it fails to provide a methodology for conducting cultural assessments. Third, does doctrine provide a model for integrating cultural assessments into the campaign planning process? The monograph examines Joint Planning, Operations and Intelligence doctrine to determine if cultural assessments are integrated into campaign planning design. Joint doctrine focuses Course of Action (COA) development on friendly and enemy actions, reactions and counteractions. It does not integrate cultural assessments of population groups into the COA development process. Finally, do military leaders and planners need to revise doctrine for campaign planning with a model for conducting cultural assessment integrated into steps of the planning process? The conclusion of this monograph is that the military should update doctrine to include a model for conducting cultural assessment and a model for the integration of this assessment into the campaign planning process. It further provides possible examples of models to begin the discussion.

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ABSTRACT

CULTURAL ASSESSMENTS AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING by Major James A. Gordon, United States Army, 52 pages.

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Second, having established the need for cultural assessments, does doctrine provide guidance, direction and techniques for conducting these assessments? Current Joint doctrine for campaign planning is examined to determine if the processes prescribed meet the requirements of current and future potential warfare. The result of this examination indicates that while Joint doctrine mentions cultural considerations in several references, it fails to provide a methodology for conducting cultural assessments.

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Finally, do military leaders and planners need to revise doctrine for campaign planning with a model for conducting cultural assessment integrated into steps of the planning process? The conclusion of this monograph is that the military should update doctrine to include a model for conducting cultural assessment and a model for the integration of this assessment into the campaign planning process. It further provides possible examples of models to begin the discussion.

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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

Campaign planning for major operations including Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) continues to be a challenge for the United States military. Using recent history as a guide, campaign planning in a major theater of operations will usually include some level of MOOTW, even if only during transition and post-conflict operations. This monograph proposes that a major deficiency in current Joint doctrine is the failure to conduct cultural assessment of population groups in an area of operations and to integrate these results into the campaign planning process.

A brief survey of history supports the need for cultural understanding, by examining case studies of actions in Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In each of these conflicts, history demonstrates that the United States either misunderstood or did not appropriately consider cultural aspects in planning campaigns. While the future success of operations in Iraq cannot yet be determined, initial data from the operation demonstrates that military planners can still improve the integration of cultural analysis into the planning process. Numerous academic and literary sources such as Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, Ralph Peters, and Eric Hoffer have provided theoretical models regarding culture. Many of the latest paradigms for defining the nature of warfare stress the need for understanding the cultural aspects of conflict. The focus of this monograph is Military Intelligence support at the Combatant Command and Joint Task Force level. Accordingly, current Joint doctrine for campaign planning is examined to determine if the processes prescribed meet the requirements of current and future potential warfare. The survey examines Joint Planning, Operations and Intelligence doctrine to determine if cultural assessment is integrated into campaign planning design.

The monograph concludes by answering the following fundamental questions. First, does history and theory demonstrate a need for cultural assessments in the campaign process? Second, does doctrine provide guidance, direction and techniques for conducting cultural

assessment? Third, does doctrine provide a model for integrating cultural assessments into the campaign planning process? Finally, after answering these initial questions, do military leaders and planners need to update doctrine for campaign planning with a model for conducting cultural assessment integrated into steps of the planning process?

Definitions

Culture

Two key terms that require definition before proceeding are “culture” and “assessment.” As this monograph proposes, the US military does a poor job first of conducting cultural assessments and second of integrating these assessments into the planning process. Defining the level of detail required for cultural assessment is critical to this argument. Perhaps indicative of our misunderstanding of the concept and the importance of culture is its definition from Joint Pub (JP) 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. It defines culture as, “A feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map.”¹ While there is indeed a material component to the concept of culture, this definition falls far short of the broader, more useful meaning of the term.

The American Heritage Dictionary defines “culture” as, “The totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions and all other products of human work and thought. These patterns, traits, and products considered as the expression of a particular period, class, community or population.”² Similarly, Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington articulates

¹ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 14 August 2002), 137.

² *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition* (Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), 454.

that culture and civilization “both involve the values, norms, institutions, and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance.”³

Dr. Bronislaw Malinowski, an influential anthropologist and author, devoted much of his academic effort and field study to the study of culture. He provides an anthropological definition of culture as “the integral whole consisting of implements and consumers’ goods, of constitutional charters for the various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs.”⁴ He describes culture as a unifying aspect, which involves coordination among people. As he explains, “In their cooperation they follow the technical rules of their status or trade, the social rules of etiquette, customary deference, as well as religious, legal and moral customs forming their behavior.”⁵

US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*, describes culture as “a critical political-military analytical concept. In studying culture the PSYOP intelligence specialist learns how a Target Audience perceives reality—the physical and social universe—as indicated through the institutions, ideas, and behavior within a Target Audience. Culture is the learned and shared attitudes, values, and ways a Target Audience behaves.”⁶

Some models of factors to consider when studying an area list culture along side of religious, historical, linguistic, legal, political, social and demographic factors. Many, however, consider culture to be the composite result of these other factors. In other words, culture is the behavior, attitudes, values and perceptions based on these numerous factors and their complex interaction. In an attempt to include all these aspects to the definition of culture, as used in this monograph, culture is a set of defining beliefs, values, attitudes and goals of a given population

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 41.

⁴ Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 36.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁶ U.S. Army FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000), Chapter 10.

group based on many interacting factors such as religion, language, ethnicity, history, tradition, demographics, and politics.

Assessment

Microsoft Encarta College dictionary defines assessment as “a judgment about something based on an understanding of the situation.”⁷ As used in this monograph, it includes both the concepts of analysis and synthesis. “Analysis” is defined as, “the separation of an intellectual or substantial whole into its constituent parts for individual study.”⁸ “Synthesis” is defined as, “the combining of separate elements or substances to form a coherent whole.”⁹ Conducting an assessment includes both the concept of examination of individual parts and their synthesis as a whole. Assessment, as used here, implies a judgment based on deeper understanding as a result of careful study of relevant factors. It is taking all the contributing factors apart and analyzing them individually, putting them back together to see how they interact, then deriving conclusions from these interactions. It is a stronger term than “considerations,” used frequently in joint doctrine in reference to cultural factors, which implies that leaders and planners should simply be aware of these factors.

Cultural assessment then, as proposed in this monograph, is a detailed analysis of factors that influence the cultural behavior and a summary of the characteristics of that culture of a given population in relation to proposed military operations. More than a simple listing of factors, cultural assessment requires an evaluation of those cultural influences (analysis) to determine overall beliefs, values, attitudes and goals of a population group (synthesis), and a further prediction (judgment) of cultural reactions to US courses of action. As will be demonstrated in this paper, this final step is the critical one. The military can amass all the experts in the world in a collective effort, but unless they share that expertise with decision-makers and planners, the

⁷ *Microsoft Encarta College Dictionary* (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 2001), 80.

⁸ *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 66.

results of their assessments will fail to be integrated with the plan. Cultural assessments are much more than cultural awareness or sensitivity briefings or documents for leaders and planners to keep on file. They require leaders and planners to continue to evaluate the campaign for cultural reactions and their implications on the accomplishment of the mission. The process of conducting cultural assessments should lead to more than awareness; it should lead to understanding. With the established definition of cultural assessment, the next step is to establish the need for this process. What evidence supports this approach?

CHAPTER TWO - HISTORY

Historical and current events indicate the pitfalls of neglecting cultural assessment. The US Military and the US in general has historically done a poor job of integrating cultural assessments in the campaign planning process. Even in MOOTW environments that clearly required a cultural understanding, the US Military has been deficient. While they have improved their abilities to conduct cultural analysis, military planners still fall short of synthesizing this analysis into an assessment, and further integrating this assessment into campaign planning. Brief examinations of case studies of Vietnam, Somalia, and Haiti demonstrate a historical weakness in cultural assessment. An examination of Operation Iraqi Freedom further demonstrates that military planners still do not have an effective means for integrating cultural assessments in the planning process.

Vietnam

While there are many different views on the causes of US failure in Vietnam, historians frequently mention a US misunderstanding of the true nature of the conflict. Douglas Pike, recognized expert on Vietnamese communism and author of multiple books on the subject, described how “America did not at the time and does not today understand the essence of the

⁹ Ibid., 1822.

Vietnam War.”¹⁰ He went on to assert that all unconventional wars are different. He stated, “Unconventional wars grow because of the peculiar political soil of individual cultures.”¹¹ As it relates to the thesis of this monograph, if each war is different, then each war requires specific and detailed analysis of each of the “peculiar political soils of individual cultures.” Pike continued by asserting that the US did not understand the willingness of the PAVN to fight a protracted war, did not understand the emphasis the PAVN put on organization, and did not understand the culture of the Vietnamese people. During this conflict, General Westmoreland, when asked at a press conference what was the answer to insurgency, he replied, “Firepower.”¹² Indeed, this focus on firepower and attrition of the enemy allowed the US Army to kill many Viet Cong, but “it never denied the enemy his source of strength - access to the people.”¹³

One attempt to address the Viet Cong’s access to the people was the Marine Combined Action Program (CAP). The CAP program placed squads of Marines in villages across South Vietnam from 1965 to 1971. These squads lived with the villagers 24 hours a day, ate their food, learned their language and culture, assisted the villagers in rebuilding their villages and defended them from the Viet Cong. It was an approach from the “Small Wars” doctrine, which emphasized “the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and consequent minimum loss of life.”¹⁴ While this contrasted with the US Army’s attrition approach, it met with some success and can be posited as a strategy for potential success in the Vietnam War.

The US also neglected a central problem in the Vietnam conflict – the corruption and inefficiency of the South Vietnamese Government. This had a distinct effect on the South Vietnamese population. When approaching this challenge from the strategic view, planners must

¹⁰ Douglas Pike, *PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 54.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 54-55.

¹² Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 197.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 197.

¹⁴ US Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), 32.

consider all elements of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic).

There was little difference in the alternatives to many South Vietnamese people when comparing North and South Vietnamese government policies. This ignorance of the needs of the population compounded the inadequacies of the US policy in Vietnam. Author and Senior Associate of the Indochina Institute at George Mason University, Neil L. Jamieson spent many years living and working in Vietnam. He echoed many of the same themes of misunderstanding of culture and summed up these concerns when he stated,

We must learn more about Vietnamese culture and Vietnamese paradigms in order to untangle the muddled debates about our own. Realizing that we must do this is the first and most important lesson of Vietnam. And it is one we Americans have been exasperatingly slow to learn. We remain far too ready to assume that other people are, or want to be, or should be, like us.¹⁵

Instead of incorporating lessons from Vietnam, the US Army chose to refocus doctrine and training on conventional war in a European scenario. This focus on conventional warfare resulted in diminished attention to MOOTW, where cultural analysis plays a more prominent role. As Professor Conrad C. Crane, the director of the US Army Military History Institute, stated in his essay on lessons not learned in Vietnam, “The post-war emphasis on conventional warfare in Europe also stunted the growth of the Army’s cultural intelligence for other regions, which had important repercussions in places like Somalia.”¹⁶

Somalia

US operations in Somalia from 1992 to 1994 are best known for the climactic battle in the streets of Mogadishu characterized by the book and movie *Black Hawk Down*.¹⁷ There were specific circumstances that led to this debacle, including a lack of cultural understanding, according to JP 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*. It includes a historical vignette that describes the

¹⁵ Neil L. Jamieson, *Understanding Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), x.

¹⁶ Conrad C. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002), 14.

evolution of the missions and approaches by US forces. It states that during the initial operations of Restore Hope, the Joint Force Commander focused on cultural aspects of the situations. He focused the intelligence effort on monitoring the local population's disposition and the adversary's intentions. By contrast, as the mission evolved from peacekeeping to peace enforcement "during UNOSOM II, US leaders failed to take certain factors of Somali culture into consideration, contributing to the operation's failure."¹⁸

A National Defense University publication, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, authored by US Army Colonel Kenneth Allard illustrates some of the cultural challenges of conflict. Allard explained that "their culture stresses the idea of 'me and my clan against all outsiders,' with alliances between clans being only temporary conveniences. Guns and aggressiveness, including the willingness to accept casualties, are intrinsic parts of this culture, with women and children considered part of the clan's order of battle."¹⁹ While US planners and operators were aware of this culture at varying levels of understanding, there were shortfalls in translating this understanding into predictive intelligence. Allard indicated this deficiency when he wrote: "The Somalia experience underlines the importance of knowing the country, the culture, the ground, and the language as a pre-condition for military operations."²⁰ As we will continue to see, the title of Allard's work is incorrect. As evidenced by subsequent operations, the US military did not learn this lesson from its Somalia experience.

Operation Uphold Democracy

Though largely seen as a successful operation, military operations in Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, provide more evidence that the US military fell short in the cultural

¹⁷ Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down, A Story of Modern War* (New York, NY: SIGNET, 2001).

¹⁸ US Department of Defense, JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 September 2002), III-10.

¹⁹ Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 13.

understanding area yet again. In a US Army Command and General Staff sponsored history of US actions, the authors compare actions and attitudes of different commands in Haiti and highlight the lack of cultural understanding of the Haitian people. A Civil Affairs officer who participated in the operations claimed that the headquarters for Operation Uphold Democracy (JTF 190) “leadership isolated itself and lacked an appreciation of the public mood.”²¹ The authors went much further, stating, “Without doubt, the diverging points of view held by US commands stemmed in part from a collective shortage of knowledge about Haiti and Haitians ... the Americans’ cultural understanding of Haitians was generally superficial.”²² The authors sum this theme up in the following passage from this work,

Uphold Democracy introduced U.S. forces into a culture vastly different from their own. Yet, in planning for the Haiti operation, the Army, in general, had little appreciation of Haitian history and culture. Few planners knew anything about Haiti, other than its basic geography... In peace operations such as Uphold Democracy, however, knowledge of how a people think and act, and how they might react to military intervention arguably becomes paramount. The U.S. military culture, in general, focuses on training warriors to use fire and maneuver and tends to resist the notion of cultural awareness.²³

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Although better described as current events at the time of this writing, operations in Iraq indicate a continued lack of appreciation of the value of cultural assessment as it impacts decisions. There does, however, seem to be a growing appreciation for the fact that planners need to consider cultural influences. The challenge seems more appropriately to be just how and when to integrate this cultural understanding in the planning process. In other words, there seems to be a growing recognition that US planners and leaders have a problem, but they have not yet found the solution.

²⁰ Ibid., 95

²¹ Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel. *“Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press), 1998, 110.

²² Ibid., 113.

²³ Ibid., 188.

Numerous sources have documented evidence of this continued lack of cultural understanding. In an insightful report commissioned by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), published shortly before the commencement of conventional operations in Iraq, the authors describe potential problems that could come with an Iraqi occupation. One of the six projected challenges in a post-conflict scenario was, “The administration of an Iraqi occupation will be complicated by deep religious, ethnic, and tribal differences which dominate Iraqi society.”²⁴ In this report, they detail potential fault lines, based on these cultural factors, which could lead to problems for occupying forces.

These factors affected the British occupation in post-World War I Iraq. Before the situation stabilized in 1921, the British had suffered approximately 2,000 casualties due to “tribal uprisings and isolated acts of terrorism.” During the initial stages of this occupation, Shi’ite clerics also proclaimed a jihad (holy war) against the British from the Shi’ite holy city of Karbala.²⁵ The authors also seemed to appreciate the difficulty of instituting democracy in Iraq by stating, “Free elections in the Arab world seldom produce pro-Western governments.”²⁶ The SSI research team discussed “winning the peace in Iraq” as follows,

The occupation of Iraq involves a myriad of complexities arising from the political and socio-economic culture of that country. This situation is further complicated by the poor understanding that Westerners and especially Americans have of Iraqi political and cultural dynamics...The possibility of the United States winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq is real and serious.²⁷

Retired US Army Major General Robert H. Scales Jr., former director of the US Army War College and published author, provided a frank discussion of the lack of cultural understanding in planning for Iraqi Freedom before the House Armed Services Committee. In his

²⁴ Conrad C. Crane and Andrew W. Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post Conflict Scenario* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003), 1.

²⁵ Ibid., 21.

²⁶ Ibid., 25.

²⁷ Ibid., 41-42.

testimony, he discussed deficiencies in intelligence and in planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Scales claimed that the general focus of US Intelligence has been on technology at the expense of analysis. He stated that all the technology in the world alone could not give you the enemy's intention or measure his will to fight. To accomplish this requires understanding. Planners should base this understanding on expert analysis of cultural factors present in that group or groups of people and other assessments. He stated that the US usually views its enemies how we would like them to be, rather than how they really are. Scales described his view as follows:

Intelligence is not just about collecting and processing great amounts of information. It is about understanding the enemy as he is and then tailoring strategic and operational approaches that turn his political framework to one's own advantage. Without this kind of political knowledge, which requires immersion in language, culture, and history of a region, the data gathered by technological means can serve only to reinforce preconceived, erroneous, sometimes disastrous notions.²⁸

Scales also related operations in Iraq to historical operations, such as US involvements in Vietnam. He said, "Vietnam-era leaders were not only often contemptuous of the enemy, but largely ignorant of his motivations, culture, and ideology."²⁹ He further warned,

If the U.S. military does not desire to repeat the mistakes of the past, then it needs to create a learning culture, where intellectual preparation is prized as highly as tactical preparation... Soldiers today must not only understand technology, but they must understand the cultural environment in which technology will be employed.³⁰

Scales described numerous instances of instability occurring in Iraq that the US military "should have seen coming." According to Scales, the optimistic scenarios of the Iraqi people rallying around the US were unwarranted. Even a simple look at history, ethnic, religious and political factors would indicate that until Saddam and the bulk of his regime was captured, the people would be wary of choosing sides with the coalition forces. His basic statement was that the US did not understand how complex the problem was in Iraq. More importantly, he painted a

²⁸ Robert H. Scales Jr., MG (R), Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, October 21, 2003, 4.

²⁹ Ibid., 10.

picture that the US does not understand the potential results of continued instability. He cautioned, “In Iraq ... an American failure to provide something substantially better than Saddam’s regime could well have a catastrophic impact on the continued flow of the world’s oil supply, the activities of international terrorists, and the chances for an end to hostilities between warring factions throughout the region.”³¹ He believes the “win the war, but lose the peace” scenario is entirely possible.

Summary

Noted historian and author Larry H. Addington stated, “with the passing of the Cold War, the danger of war has been chiefly associated with lesser states rather than with great powers, their motives stemming from ultranationalism, ethnocentrism, conflicts of religion and culture, and the search for economic and military security.”³² Despite one’s particular interpretation of recent historical events, a common thread of US military operations seems to be a lack of cultural understanding regarding their enemies and population groups in general, ranging from conscious disregard to simple misunderstanding. This chapter has outlined some examples of poor integration of cultural aspects in the planning process in past and recent operations.

CHAPTER THREE - THEORY

Based on this history and predictions of the future, prominent academic, literary and military thinkers have established models for modern and future warfare that indicate a necessity for some form of cultural assessment. Former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak introduced the phrase "three block war" describing the complex situations in current and future conflict. Samuel Huntington and foreign correspondent Robert Kaplan

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 12.

³² Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 325.

described the future of warfare as one influenced strongly by culture. Commentator Ralph Peters discussed this phenomenon in his article "The Human Terrain of Urban Operations." Author Eric Hoffer describes human conditions likely for mass movements. Whether major campaigns include urban operations, nation building, humanitarian assistance or counter insurgency operations, many theorists state that understanding the culture of an operational area early in planning is essential for success.

"The Three Block War"

A recurring and central theme of this monograph is the position that leaders and planners cannot consider modern warfare strictly as conventional combat operations. Instead, modern warfare is better described as *simultaneous* Full Spectrum Operations. Former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak discussed this reality in his writings on "The Three Block War." In his paradigm, he described situations in which military forces will have to conduct different operations within close proximity to each other. Specifically, he described a situation where, on one block, Marines may be fighting a high intensity battle against regular forces, the next block they might be fighting against irregular forces, and the next block they are conducting humanitarian assistance.³³ This is important because it implies a more detailed assessment of the situation, including cultural influences. It also implies that all forces must be trained in skills necessary in all of the spectrums of conflict. Since the situation is constantly changing, a simple plan of training "warfighters" separately from "peacekeepers" will not be adequate. Current and recent operations indicate that it may be even more complicated than Krulak's paradigm. Warfare is increasingly becoming what one could call a "One Block War." Military planners may have to plan to conduct these different operations on the same city block at the same time.

³³ Charles Krulak, GEN, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps White Letter Number 3-98, June 26, 1998.

“Regime Change”

Dr. Frederick Kagan, published author and associate professor of history at the US Military Academy at West Point, attributed some of the poor planning for post-hostility operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom to an attitude of the US government’s reluctance to become involved in nation building or peacekeeping. Kagan quotes President George W. Bush’s speech to the Citadel in 1999 in which he stated, “we will not be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties... superpowers don’t do windows.”³⁴ According to Kagan, this attitude has further contributed to a singular focus on warfighting capabilities, neglecting the cultural aspects of a campaign. Kagan stated,

If the U.S. is to undertake wars that aim at regime change and maintain its current critical role in controlling and directing world affairs, then it must fundamentally change its views of war. It is not enough to consider simply how to pound the enemy into submission with stand-off forces. War plans also must consider how to make the transition from that defeated government to a new one. A doctrine based on the notion that superpowers don’t do windows will fail in this task. Regime change is inextricably intertwined with nation-building and peacekeeping. Those elements must be factored into any such plan from the outset.³⁵

“The Clash of Civilizations”

Planning for the situations described above requires an understanding of a given area’s culture. Prominent historian and Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington placed culture at the heart of conflict in his best selling book, *The Clash of Civilizations*. He stated that the central theme of his book was “that culture and culture identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world.”³⁶ Huntington used history to support his argument that warfare is based on

³⁴ Frederick W. Kagan. “War and Aftermath,” *Policy Review* (Aug 2003), 2.

³⁵ Ibid., 19.

³⁶ Huntington, 20.

cultural differences. He further stated, “In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural.”³⁷ “The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.”³⁸ He describes his frame of reference effectively,

A civilization is the broadest cultural identity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Chinese or Hindu communities. Chinese, Hindus and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural identity. They constitute civilizations.³⁹

Huntington went further to propose that religion was usually the most important ingredient of culture, with language coming in second. As a result of these cultural differences between civilizations, he predicted a likely showdown between the Western and the Islamic and possibly Sinic civilizations. Following Huntington’s argument, cultural and civilizational self-identification seems to be an increasingly important motivator for conflict.

“The Coming Anarchy”

Robert Kaplan, foreign correspondent and prolific author, described recent and future warfare from a slightly different viewpoint. He used historical and recent conditions in Africa as a model for warfare in the future. The title of his book, *The Coming Anarchy*, best describes his prediction of the future, akin to what Africa is experiencing today: a move towards anarchy as a result of the combined effects of rapidly increasing populations and dwindling natural resources. He further proposed that in the future, the countries of the world would not be defined by boundaries on maps, but by tribal, ethnic, and religious populations. There is a distinct appreciation for the impact of culture in Kaplan’s approach. He stated, “To understand the events

³⁷ Ibid., 21.

³⁸ Ibid., 28.

³⁹ Ibid., 43.

of the next fifty years, then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.”⁴⁰

As an example of the primacy Kaplan places on cultural influence, take his discussion of conflict in the Caucasus, specifically in Azerbaijan.

Azeri Turks, the world’s most secular Shi’ite Muslims, see their cultural identity in terms not of religion, but of their Turkic race. The Armenians, likewise, fight the Azeris not because the latter are Muslims but because they are Turks, related to the same Turks who massacred the Armenians in 1915. Turkic culture (secular and based on languages employing a Latin script) is battling Iranian culture (religiously militant as defined by Tehran, and wedded to the Arabic script) across the whole swath of Central Asia and the Caucasus.⁴¹

Kaplan captures numerous points in this passage. First, each area or region may have different factors that are stronger influences on their culture. Religion does not always dominate a culture. Second, by his simple summation of the problems between these two peoples, a frame of reference can be established for their responses to different situations. By his description, if you understand the basic priorities, beliefs, values and attitudes of a people, it is easier to determine most likely responses to situations.

“Human Terrain”

Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters is a commentator, essayist, author, and contributor to such periodicals as *The Wall Street Journal*, *The New York Post*, and *The Washington Post*. He provided a discussion on “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations” in *Parameters*, the US Army War College’s quarterly publication of items of strategic military interests. In this article, he proposed that the US military focuses too much on physical terrain, and not enough on human terrain. He claimed that the center of gravity in urban operations is the population. Peters provides what he describes as a “crude framework for thinking about the

⁴⁰ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy* (New York: Random House, 2000), 18-19.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 28.

military nature of cities.”⁴² According to his framework, there are three different types of cities: hierarchical, multicultural and tribal.

The hierarchical city’s majority population accepts the rule of law, and generally understands that the benefits of cohesion and cooperation outweigh any cultural distinctions. The multicultural city’s population is that “in which contending systems of custom and belief, often aggravated by ethnic divisions, struggle for dominance.”⁴³ The tribal city is the most difficult urban environment for peacekeeping operations. He stated that, “based on differences in blood, but not in race or, necessarily, in religion, ethnic conflicts in this environment can be the most intractable and merciless.”⁴⁴ Peters asserted that there is predictive value in understanding which of these environments a military force is operating. He stated that this understanding can “provide early warning of the intractable nature of the problems that may await even an initially welcome peacekeeping force.”⁴⁵ Even though Peters’ classification system oversimplifies the possible differences in populations, it emphasizes the importance of the culture of the “human terrain” in a given military situation.

“True Believers”

Noted author Eric Hoffer’s insightful and timeless book, *The True Believer*, focused on human conditions that were conducive to mass movements. While certainly not applicable to every conflict, his analysis of influences provides an interesting model for analyzing propensity for action by the masses. He stated that the potential converts to a mass movement are generally made up of the “undesirables” of a society: poor, misfits, outcasts, minorities, adolescent youths,

⁴² Ralph Peters, “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations.” *Parameters*, US Army War College Quarterly (Spring, 2000): 6.

⁴³ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 1.

ambitious, those in the grip of a vice or obsession, the impotent of body or mind, the inordinately selfish, the bored, and the sinners.⁴⁶

Hoffer went on to describe conditions that were favorable to mass movements. As he related, unifying agents necessary in a mass movement are: hatred, imitation, persuasion and coercion, leadership, action, and suspicion.⁴⁷ One of the reasons Hoffer is relevant to this discussion is that he describes universal characteristics of mass movements. He does not specifically describe Islamic Fundamentalism, Nazism, or Communism. He wrote of the similarities in the conditions that precipitated all these mass movements. While many of these factors are difficult to measure, a certain amount of predictability can be inferred from statements like, “there is perhaps no more reliable indicator of a society’s ripeness for a mass movement than the prevalence of unrelieved boredom.”⁴⁸ Put simply, by examining the factors proposed by Eric Hoffer, an analyst is likely to have at least a rudimentary appreciation for the likelihood of a mass movement in a given area, and more importantly, is able to help develop a plan to minimize the propensity for mass movement support.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to establish a theoretical baseline for the importance of understanding culture in modern conflict. Although the theorists examined in this chapter approach conflict differently, they all argue the importance of understanding the culture of combatants and the population. Concepts such as “The Three Block War,” “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations,” “Clash of Civilizations,” and “The True Believer” all indicate the increasing importance of understanding culture in modern conflict. This general appreciation of prominent theorists quite likely indicates that the key to understanding future conflict is cultural understanding. As this deficiency seems to be common knowledge to many theorists, military

⁴⁶ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc, 1951), 30.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 85-118.

professionals and historians, have doctrine writers revised joint doctrine to address this lack of cultural assessment in military planning as it relates to decision-making?

CHAPTER FOUR – DOCTRINE

The previous two chapters have provided ample evidence to establish the value and necessity of cultural assessments in the campaign process and affirmatively answer the first question offered in this monograph. The focus now turns to doctrine. The purpose of this chapter is to survey joint doctrinal publications to determine how well they address the second and third questions posed: Does doctrine provide guidance, direction and techniques for conducting cultural assessment and a model for integrating cultural assessments into the campaign planning process? The focus of the analysis will be on Joint doctrine for US military planning, intelligence and operations in order to determine what doctrine states about cultural assessments in these efforts.

Joint Planning

Joint doctrine does include “considerations” for cultural implications, principally focused on how they relate to the enemy. In its discussion of intelligence support to campaign planning, JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations*, emphasizes the importance of understanding the attitudes, values and reactions of the enemy as it relates to his center of gravity,

...not only must intelligence analysts and planners develop an understanding of the adversary’s capabilities and vulnerabilities, they must take into account the way that friendly forces and actions appear from the adversary’s viewpoint. Otherwise, planners may fall into the trap of ascribing to the adversary particular attitudes, values, and reactions that “mirror image” US actions in the same situation, or by assuming that the adversary will respond or act in a particular manner.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ibid., 53.

⁴⁹ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-00, *Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations*, 2nd Draft (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 10 December 2002), IV-16

In this passage the doctrine writers are discussing one of the key factors in cultural understanding: the cultural attitudes, values, and reactions of the enemy. What it does not consider are the same factors in relation to the population or various population groups. JP 5-0 mentions cultural considerations of the population twice in its MOOTW campaign planning considerations. The fifth and seventh “considerations” listed are the:

... nature of society in the operational area (for example, population and demographics, history, general culture, economy, politics, infrastructure, military and security forces, potential destabilizing factors, insurgencies, etc.) ... nature of the crisis, to include identification of critical events, economic problems, natural disaster, government reaction, recent military defeat, religious influences, or ethnic conflict.⁵⁰

These two passages are the only occurrences where JP 5-0 mentions cultural factors as they relate to population groups. Two issues begin to emerge. The first is that doctrine leads planners to consider cultural factors when planning for MOOTW operations, but not when conducting major combat operations or a campaign that includes both. The second issue is that even though the JP 5 series publications mention these cultural factors in relation to MOOTW, they provide little detail in how planners are to consider these cultural factors in the process of course of action development, comparison, and approval. As demonstrated in the following sections, these themes are repeated in other joint publications.

Joint Operations

In its discussion of the range of military operations, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, divides operations into two categories, with sub-categories for the second. The first category of operations is “War,” when “the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations.”⁵¹ The second category is MOOTW, “military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace.” It further separates MOOTW into “MOOTW

⁵⁰ Ibid., IV-6.

⁵¹ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001), I-2.

Involving the Use or Threat of Force” and “MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force.”⁵² To the doctrine writers’ credit, it does acknowledge the possibility for simultaneous operations within a Combatant Commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). It goes further in stating, “Often, military operations will have multiple purposes as dictated by a fluid and changing situation.”⁵³ After this admission and recommendation for flexibility, however, JP 3-0 quickly returns to separate and distinct models and sets of considerations for War and MOOTW.

Similar to JP 5-0, JP 3-0 addresses cultural considerations in several places. In “Considerations before Combat,” the section for preparation of the operational area describes the preparation as such; “Most inclusive is preparing the operational area, which involves intelligence and counterintelligence operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area.”⁵⁴ It also recommends interagency involvement, stating, “Liaison personnel from the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC’s intelligence requirements.”⁵⁵ Aside from brief passages, however, JP3-0 provides little guidance for the consideration of cultural factors in the planning process (beyond an initial estimate).

Military Operations Other Than War

As noted above, Joint doctrine acknowledges the importance of cultural intelligence in MOOTW campaigns. In JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, it continues to highlight the distinction between War and MOOTW, stating, “In war, intelligence collection includes an entire range of factors with a major emphasis on the enemy’s military capability. Intelligence collection in MOOTW, however, might require a focus on understanding

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., I-4.

⁵⁴ Ibid., IV-1.

⁵⁵ Ibid., IV-2.

the political, cultural and economic factors that affect the situation.”⁵⁶ It adds emphasis to this point by the following passage: “It is *only* through an understanding of the values by which the people define themselves, that an intervenor can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy and assure that actions intended to be coercive, do *in fact* have the intended effect (emphasis added).”⁵⁷ Yet, even though these considerations are recommended in the chapter on planning, JP 3-07 provides little guidance on how to integrate these considerations into the planning process.

JP 3-07 does provide an interesting discussion on Transition Operations. This discussion supports this paper’s earlier proposition that war planning, by necessity, requires MOOTW planning. It clearly states, “A commander’s campaign plan should include a transition from wartime operation to MOOTW.”⁵⁸ It continues by stating, “The manner in which US forces terminate their involvement may influence the perception of the legitimacy of the entire operation.”⁵⁹ While this passage comes close to illuminating a key issue, it falls short. Perceptions of legitimacy may not only be influenced by the way the operation is terminated. The perceptions may also be determined in the way the US forces conduct combat operations prior to transition operations. Moreover, in most campaigns, planners and leaders must consider the issue of legitimacy well before the transition from major combat operations to MOOTW.

Joint Urban Operations

JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*, comes the closest to addressing the importance of cultural assessment. The introduction to JP 3-06 indicates why this manual is so relevant to the current discussion and to warfare in general. It states, “Rapid urbanization is changing the physical and political face of nations. Demographic studies indicate a vast increase in the number and size of urban areas throughout the world...This population concentration has

⁵⁶ US Department of Defense, JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 June 1995), IV-2.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., IV-11–12.

ensured that many future military operations will be taking place in urban areas.”⁶⁰ As this publication indicates, cultural assessments are essential in a joint urban environment. The framework provided for analysis of the environment is the “Urban Triad.” The Urban Triad is composed of the physical terrain, the population, and the infrastructure that supports that population. These three characteristics interact with one another, in a “dynamic system of systems, with a unique physical, political, economic, social, and cultural identity.”⁶¹

JP 3-06 discusses the importance of understanding the environment in which military forces will be operating. In its discussion of this understanding, the level of detail required when examining military operations begins to appear. JP 3-06 displays a solid appreciation of the complexity of joint urban operations. It also covers the theme of the importance of cultural assessment of population groups. As in other publications, it does provide useful lists of considerations, but falls short in providing a planning model that implements cultural assessment.

Joint Intelligence

The intelligence community has the responsibility of providing cultural assessments of both the enemy and population. The JP 2 series publications, then, should provide the level of detail required to address cultural assessment of the enemy and the population. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, is the capstone publication for joint intelligence operations. Unfortunately, it too fails to provide the details necessary for cultural assessment. It continues the theme that war has different requirements than MOOTW concerning cultural considerations. According to JP 2-0, the only situation when “Intelligence develops knowledge of the environment in relation to the JFC’s questions concerning actual and potential threats, terrain, climate, and weather, infrastructure, cultural characteristics, medical conditions,

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ US Department of Defense, JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 September 2002), vii.

population, leadership, and many other issues concerning the operational area” is during “MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force.”⁶² JP 2-0 does not list these requirements under “war” or “MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force.”

Moreover, the list of the “attributes of intelligence” in JP 2-0 is heavily adversary oriented. The attribute of “accurate” is “Intelligence must be factually correct, convey an appreciation for facts and the situation as it exists, and estimate future situations and courses of adversary action based on those facts and sound judgment.” The attribute of “complete” is “complete intelligence answers the commander’s questions about the adversary to the fullest degree possible...To be complete, intelligence must identify all of the adversary’s capabilities.” In its discussion of the attribute “relevant,” it states, “Intelligence must contribute to the commander’s understanding of the adversary, but not burden the commander with intelligence that is of minimal or no importance to the current mission.”⁶³ Doctrine requires intelligence to meet these standards as they relate to the adversary, but, as history and theory indicate, these standards alone do not meet the intelligence requirements of modern war.

JP 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB)*, provides many effective tools that could be useful in conducting a cultural assessment. Tools such as the association matrix, population status overlay, legal status overlay, pattern analysis plot sheet, infrastructure overlay, and the activities matrix are extremely helpful in depicting cultural factors and cultural fault lines within an area of operations. JP 2-01.3 is valuable for supporting cultural assessment in this sense. However, the JIPB process itself leads planners to fall short in conducting a cultural assessment. A quick analysis of the doctrinal steps of JIPB will illustrate the issue.

⁶¹ Ibid., I-2 – I-3.

⁶² US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 9 March 2000), I-6.

⁶³ Ibid., II-14 – II-16.

Step one of JIPB is “Define the Battlespace Environment.” During this step, planners are attempting to determine the nature and scope of the warfare that faces them. “The joint force staff assists the JFC and component commanders in determining the dimensions of the joint force’s battlespace by identifying the important characteristics of the battlespace, and gathering information relating to the battlespace environment and the adversary.”⁶⁴ During this first step, determining significant characteristics of the area of operations and determining the full spectrum of the joint force’s battlespace, allows analysts to conduct a cursory analysis of enemy and population cultural factors in the process.




Figure 1. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace⁶⁵

During the second step, “Describe the Battlespace’s Effects,” planners analyze the military aspects of each dimension, evaluate the effects of each battlespace dimension on military operations and describe the battlespace’s effects on adversary and friendly capabilities and broad

⁶⁴ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace* (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 24 May 2000), II-2.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, II-1.

courses of action.⁶⁶ Planners consider the specific environment where and when military operations will take place and attempt to evaluate friendly and enemy courses of action. This step is critical in determining the myriad of influences that the environment (terrain, weather, population, infrastructure, NGOs, etc.) has on US military success. Enemy and population cultural assessments are not, however, required in the JIPB process in support of campaign planning. The remaining steps in the process focus less on the cultural influences of different population groups and more on the “adversary”.

The third step of JIPB is “Evaluate the Adversary.” It identifies and evaluates the adversary’s military and relevant civil COGs, critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations and the doctrine and TTP employed by adversary forces, absent any constraints that may be imposed by the battlespace environment.”⁶⁷ Traditionally, the closer in intensity an operation is to “war” the more likely this step becomes exclusively focused on the enemy. As was evidenced in the discussion of Somalia, as the mission evolved from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, US leaders and planners began to focus narrowly on specific enemies, and lost touch with the population issues. Certainly, the adversary represents the greatest danger to US forces in most cases. Therefore, it usually deserves the emphasis it receives during planning for combat operations. However, this analysis need not focus on the enemy at the expense of population analysis. As has been demonstrated in this monograph, combat is less and less likely to occur in an area devoid of population.

The fourth step of JIPB is “Determine Adversary Courses of Action.” During this step, analysts combine the products and effects of the first three steps to determine likely enemy courses of action. As a result of this step, the staff is to: “identify the adversary’s likely objectives and desired end state, identify the full set of courses of action available to the adversary, evaluate and prioritize each course of action in the amount of detail time allows, and

⁶⁶ Ibid., II-9.

identify initial collection requirements.”⁶⁸ This task, determining the “full set of courses of action available to the adversary,” is a much higher priority than determining “population courses of action.” This may be appropriate for specific phases of the campaign. However, when designing a campaign plan, planners must link causes and effects of periods of combat with the periods of MOOTW. As this paper has shown, history, theory and doctrine indicate that war and MOOTW are likely to occur simultaneously.

The Intelligence Estimate format, as provided in JP 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, demonstrates the emphasis on steps three and four of the IPB process. The only reference to any type of cultural assessment is in section 2, “Characteristics of the operational area” (derived from steps one and two of the IPB process). Under this section is the heading “Sociology,” which is listed below:

Sociology

- (a) Existing Situation. Describe language, religion, social institutions and attitudes, minority groups, population distribution, health and sanitation, and other related factors.
- (b) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad adversary capabilities.
- (c) Effect on Friendly COAs. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on COAs for friendly forces.⁶⁹

While this paragraph in the Intelligence Estimate requires a limited amount of cultural analysis, it appears early in the document and in the IPB process, and is not required to be reviewed in detail after specific friendly and enemy courses of action are considered. Notice that doctrine tells the planner to “discuss the effects of the sociological situation on *broad* adversary capabilities (emphasis added).” This format does not require the analyst to determine population courses of action in reaction to specific adversary courses of action in relation to specific friendly courses of actions.

⁶⁷ Ibid., II-44.

⁶⁸ Ibid., II-54.

⁶⁹ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations* (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 20 November 1996), D-5.

Summary

Joint publications provide specific models of major combat operations and specific models of MOOTW. While this may be helpful from a planning perspective to establish priorities, when planning a campaign that includes both War and MOOTW, factors from each need to be considered in all phases of the campaign. According to doctrine, planning considerations for each one are different. Earlier discussions on the “Three Block War” paradigm and challenges of “regime change” challenge this assertion that planners can separate campaigns into War or MOOTW. This phenomenon increases in likelihood with increased urbanization on the planet. Joint planning doctrine, however, encourages planners to classify an operation in a category, and then apply the fundamentals of that category to the planning effort.

Differences in the way doctrinal publications classify fundamentals, considerations and principles for major combat operations versus MOOTW highlight this “cookie cutter” approach. Consider, for example, the comparison of the Principles of War and the Principles for MOOTW. Principles of War as listed in JP 3-0 are Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise and Simplicity.⁷⁰ JP 3-0 lists Principles for MOOTW as Objective, Unity of Effort, Security, Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy.⁷¹ Doctrine creates a clear distinction between the two. However, if planners and leaders do not envision the campaign plan holistically, with operations involving differing levels of War and MOOTW, and how their second and third order effects impact on each other, then efforts in each level of war may or may not support one another.

This brief survey of joint doctrine illuminates several key deficiencies as it relates to cultural assessment. First, joint doctrine distinguishes planning factors, fundamentals and level of analysis between War and MOOTW. This leads planners to focus on certain elements at the

⁷⁰ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001), A-1.

⁷¹ Ibid., V-2.

expense of others. Second, even in cases where cultural intelligence is deemed important, such as MOOTW and Urban operations, scant guidance is provided on what steps should be taken to integrate these factors into the planning process. Typically, doctrine mentions these cultural factors simply as “considerations.” In addition, joint doctrine does not require the planner to evaluate population courses of action in reaction to the selected friendly and likely enemy courses of action as a result of the wargaming process. Finally, Joint Intelligence doctrine does not provide a detailed model for cultural assessment that includes analysis, synthesis, and prediction. In summary, while joint doctrine discusses the consideration of cultural analysis, especially in MOOTW and Urban Operations, it fails to provide a model for an assessment and fails to provide a model for integrating this assessment into the planning and decision-making processes.

CHAPTER FIVE – ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and analyze additional models that may be useful in conducting and integrating cultural assessments. As demonstrated below, many of the techniques exist in different locations, but have not been fused together in a coherent process that fits into current campaign planning doctrine. This chapter identifies sources and models for consideration.

Additional References

US Army Intelligence, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Religious Support doctrine provide useful tools in the effort to conduct cultural assessment. FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)*, devotes a chapter to IPB in MOOTW, organized by types of MOOTW missions with a list of specific questions recommended for each type of operation. As an illustration, the section addressing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief directs the analyst to “focus on demographics, considering, for example, the effects of population distribution patterns, ethnic divisions, religious beliefs, language divisions, tribe, clan, and sub-

clan loyalties, health hazards, and political sympathies.”⁷² This, and other similar lists of questions in this chapter, steer the analysts to analyze cultural factors and their possible impacts on the mission at hand.

FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, includes a very detailed and extremely useful Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment Format. In the section “culture and social structure,” CA planners are required to provide detailed and specific information on culture, social structure, languages, and religion.⁷³ It must be admitted that this format, while labeled an “assessment” is better described as “analysis” as defined in this monograph. Nevertheless, the level of detail required to complete this assessment is instrumental in developing situational understanding in a given area and can significantly contribute to a cultural assessment.

FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations* includes a chapter on intelligence requirements for Psychological Operations. This chapter provides a fourteen factor political-military analytical framework that includes such factors as cultural environment, political system, ideology, religion, and ethnicity. It further describes a process of “Target Analysis” which attempts to identify dominant cultural factors and organize groups of people into like-minded groups. PSYOPs tools are effective as they apply to the current discussion because they are concerned with the perceptions of population groups. In order to understand how to influence perception, one must first understand the cultural elements that frame those perceptions.

FM 1-05, *Religious Support*, provides a “Guide for Religious Area/Impact Assessment.” This guide directs the planners to identify key factors such as holy days, rituals and customs, sites and shrines, primary values, leadership, tolerance, relationship to society, organization doctrines,

⁷² US Army, FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), 6-2.

⁷³ US Army, FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000) G-3 – G-6.

and history.⁷⁴ This tool, like the others listed above is focused more on analysis, and less on assessment. This detailed question guide, however, can be a very useful starting point for an assessment in an environment where religion has a predominant influence on culture.

These Army doctrinal tools, if applied, can greatly assist the planner in defining the nature of the operating environment, but used on their own, they only provide part of the picture. While these references identify useful cultural considerations in separate places, neither Army nor joint doctrine address either synthesizing the results of using these tools or analyzing courses of action in relation to these cultural consideration factors. This will be the focus of the following analysis.

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

As JIPB is the doctrinal framework for intelligence analysis, the first area addressed is the scope of JIPB. The RAND publication, *Street Smart, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations*, was written for US Army intelligence analysts and planners to provide a model to adapt IPB to an urban environment. As demonstrated below, there is little difference in the US Army's IPB and Joint doctrinal JIPB. In steps one and two, JIPB uses the term "battlespace" as opposed to "battlefield." In steps three and four, JIPB uses the term "adversary" instead of "enemy." Much as this monograph proposed earlier, *Street Smart* is critical of IPB for focusing steps three and four exclusively on enemy actions. Figure 2 indicates RAND'S proposed changes to the Army and Joint labels of the four traditional steps of the IPB process.

The Four Steps of IPB

⁷⁴ US Army, FM 1-05, *Religious Support* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 18 April 2003), Appendix F.

US Army IPB	JIPB	Suggested New Label
1. Define the Battlefield Area	1. Define the Battlespace Environment	1. Define the Operating Environment
2. Describe the Battlefield's Effects	2. Describe the Battlespace's Effects	2. Describe the Operating Environment's Effects
3. Evaluate the Threat	3. Evaluate the Adversary	3. Identify and Evaluate Threats and Relevant Influences
4. Develop Enemy Courses of Action	4. Determine Adversary Courses of Action	4. Develop Non-U.S. Courses of Action

Figure 2. Proposed changes to IPB for an Urban Environment ⁷⁵

Notice in steps one and two the word “battlefield” or “battlespace” is replaced with “operating environment.” This difference is not simply a change in the words. The term “operating environment” indicates a much more complex situation than an open terrain “battlefield” where the blue are friendly and the red are enemy. With its focus on the urban environment, *Street Smart* considers population analysis a key element of the IPB process. In their discussions of step two in the IPB process, the authors provide additional tools for cultural assessment. Some of these recommended tools are: Lists and timelines of salient cultural and political events, culture description or cultural comparison chart or matrix, line of confrontation overlay or matrix, and culturally significant structures overlay.⁷⁶ One of the new tools they recommend is the “relationship matrix” (Figure 3). It takes the lists of relevant influences and integrates them to display relationships. As indicated in this figure, a population group can be one of many relevant influences.

⁷⁵ Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, *Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 37, with JIPB steps added.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 60-61.




Figure 3. Sample Relationship Matrix ⁷⁷

The most significant difference between the traditional IPB model and their proposed new one, however, is the change in steps three and four. Notice that the suggested label of step three requires the analyst to evaluate more than the “threat” or “adversary.” The new label indicates that the analyst must also evaluate “relevant influences.” The authors describe step three as follows, “Step three of IPB for urban operations must first *identify* the elements, human and otherwise, that can *harm, interfere with, or otherwise significantly influence* friendly force activities. Once identified, the most mission significant elements can be prioritized for fuller evaluation. Others can be handled as time allows.”⁷⁸ This poses the idea that the population, or more appropriately, different population groups can be sets of relevant influences that can influence mission accomplishment. In this section, *Street Smart* introduces a “continuum of relative interests” to loosely classify different population groups (Figure 4). Planners can

⁷⁷ Ibid., 63.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 91-92.

evaluate these population groups, once classified, to determine their attitude towards and level of influence on the course of action. Population groups are not in a static position on the continuum. They can move from one category to another, often very rapidly. The critical factors to identify are what conditions push population groups from one category to another. Planners conduct this assessment in the suggested new label for step four of the IPB of “Develop non-U.S. courses of action.”




Figure 4. Continuum of Relative Interests⁷⁹

The authors describe the purpose of step four as follows,

This step should seek to develop COA for groups that are potential threats, as well as COA for groups that might act together against the United States. COA should also be developed for groups that do not at the outset appear to be threatening but might, because of a series of events, become involved in activities that could impact the overall mission of the unit.⁸⁰

This model widens the scope of IPB in an attempt to provide situational understanding in an increasingly complex urban environment, and it does so without radically departing from current IPB doctrine (by the authors' design). While this model does widen the scope of IPB, it does not indicate how planners should integrate the results of this IPB into the overall planning process.

The following models attempt to fill in the gaps.

Towards a Cultural Assessment Model

Culture is a complex concept, consisting of countless interactions between influencing variables. Figure 5 illustrates this complexity. The goal of cultural assessment is first to determine the beliefs, values, attitudes and goals in the overall sense and second determine likely reactions to specific friendly and enemy courses of action. Using the example below, the critical

⁷⁹ Ibid., 99.

question is: How do all these elements interact and synthesize to produce a coherent (or at least semi-coherent) culture in the center? The elements listed here are not prescriptive in nature, simply a sampling of possible demographic influences on a given population's culture.




Figure 5. Demographic Elements that Influence Culture (Created by author)

Figure 6 displays a logical structure for part 1 of this process. This part is time consuming and requires expert assistance. The analyst would conduct part 1 during mission analysis. First is an enumeration of demographic elements and their salient characteristics. As already noted, existing Intelligence, Civil Affairs, and PSYOPS tools can be used to facilitate this assessment. Next, the analyst must determine the dominant demographic elements in this culture. As noted earlier, there is not a standard answer for the most dominant element. Following this portion of the assessment, the analyst must determine the overall dominant beliefs, values, attitudes and goals of the population group.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 124.

- Group _____
- Basic Elements of culture (can be added to or removed):
 - Religion:
 - Language:
 - Ethnicity:
 - Tradition:
 - Political Organization:
 - Ideology:
 - Economy:
 - History:
 - Geographic and Climatic Environment:
- What are the dominant cultural elements for this population group?
- What are the dominant values, beliefs, attitudes and goals as a result of the interaction of these elements?

Figure 6. Part 1 – Cultural Assessment (Created by author)

Part 2 of the assessment, as displayed in figure 7, addresses specific courses of action. This step will provide possible reactions to US military COAs. In this portion, planners would rank order likely group reactions from most likely to least likely for each specific friendly COA. It also provides the analyst and/or expert a means to interject their assessment back into the process, by recommending possible culturally acceptable alternatives that will achieve the same or similar endstates.

- COA Number and Statement:

- Likely Group __ reactions. Include the dominant cultural element(s) that contribute to each reaction.
 - 1)
 - 2)
 - 3)
 - 4)
- If unacceptable, what are acceptable alternatives that achieve the stated endstate and fit the cultural circumstances?

Figure 7. Part 2 – COA Cultural Assessment (Created by author)

Integration of Cultural Assessment

A working study group at the School of Advanced Military Studies has provided a possible answer to the second deficiency (lack of guidance on what steps should be taken to integrate cultural factors into the planning process), namely the need to inject these cultural assessments into the planning process.⁸¹ As a result of similar conclusions to those found in this work, they developed a process that integrates this cultural assessment into already established joint planning doctrine. They overlay this process on the Deliberate Planning Process as described in JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. Specifically, they prescribe that during deliberate planning, this integration of cultural assessments should occur during Phase II, Concept Development. Figure 8 depicts when the process should occur. While this study group used the Deliberate Planning Process to explain their model, one can just as easily overlay this process on the COA Development in the Crisis Action Planning format.

⁸¹ James A. Gordon, MAJ, USA, Steven McCluskey, LTC, Canada, Leonard Law, MAJ, USA, Andrew Preston, MAJ, USA, Douglas Serrano, COL, USA. *SAMS Seminar Four Working Group – Cultural Analysis in the Planning Process*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. CGSC, 2004.




Figure 8. Integrating Cultural Assessment into the Process ⁸²

This model proposes that initial cultural analysis should occur during step 1, “Mission Analysis.” This product will be further refined during subsequent steps, resulting in each course of action being analyzed for possible cultural reactions to those COAs. If the anticipated cultural reaction to the COA is unacceptable, it dictates a decision to either change the planned action, or

⁸² Ibid.

accept risk and plan risk mitigation. It highlights the necessity of decision points, branches and sequels as a result of specific cultural reactions.

Civil Information Requirements

Another technique that planners could use to elevate the issue of cultural assessment is the use of Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). Currently, doctrine organizes these information requirements into two sets, Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR).⁸³ While FFIR are focused exclusively on friendly forces, PIR can have a broader applicability. JP 2-0 defines PIR as "those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision making."⁸⁴ Although the statement "PIRs are the commander's statements of the force's critical intelligence needs"⁸⁵ does not necessarily exclude civil concerns, in practice, as this author observes, planners typically design PIR to answer adversary questions. This again leaves a potential void for a significant set of influencers in the operating environment that may affect the commander's decisions.

By the use of a third category not extant in current doctrine, Civil Information Requirements (CIR),⁸⁶ planners can focus collection assets on key deficiencies in the cultural assessment product. CIR would function just as PIR and FFIR do. Doctrine states that planners should focus PIR and FFIR on answering questions the commanders need before making a decision. Instead of being focused on the enemy or friendly forces, CIR are focused on population group inputs to decision making. This could be the population as a whole, or, more likely, sub-sets of the general population. In Somalia, for example, the population's reactions to

⁸³ US Department of Defense, JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 13 January 1999), GL-7.

⁸⁴ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 9 March 2000), GL-8.

⁸⁵ Ibid., II-3.

⁸⁶ Developed by author

specific US operations were important. In this situation, the people that the US went to help became the adversary. CIR can focus collection on determining what conditions might create a dangerous situation with population groups. The CIR development process will also ensure that commanders use the results of cultural assessments to support their decision-making.

CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The main purpose of this chapter is to conclude the monograph by answering the research questions based on an evaluation of history, theory and doctrine. Those questions were: First, is there a need for cultural assessments in the campaign process? Second, does doctrine provide guidance, direction and techniques for conducting cultural assessment? Third, does doctrine provide a model for integrating cultural assessments into the campaign planning process? Finally, after answering these initial questions, do military leaders and planners need to update doctrine for campaign planning with a model for conducting cultural assessment integrated into steps of the planning process?

Three major conclusions may be derived from this study, which indicate a need for cultural assessments in the campaign planning process. First, as shown in the examples from Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, and Iraq, history highlights a history of US planners and leaders poorly appreciating the effects of culture. These examples also support the argument that leaders and planners should not separate or isolate war considerations from MOOTW considerations. At some point during war, either concurrent with or immediately afterwards, MOOTW will take place.

Second, noted theoreticians and students of conflict posit that cultural factors will increasingly influence future warfare. If this is indeed an increasingly likely scenario, planners who fail to adequately address cultural influences at the outset of their planning efforts do so at

the risk of achieving overall objectives. Third is the simple reality that, in combination with the first two, increased urbanization and population growth increases the likelihood of the involvement of the civilian population as a critical factor in warfare. Planners should consider not only the adversary's cultural factors, but the population's as well, which may or may not be homogeneous. They may very well be different sets of reactions among various groups.

As demonstrated here, joint doctrine is deficient in addressing realities evidenced in history and theory in two key aspects. First, doctrine does not provide a process or model for cultural assessments. US Army Military Intelligence, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations functional areas provide sets of tools that can facilitate this assessment, but there is not a model that depicts how to fuse all this information to provide likely "population group" courses of action. Second, even if planners were to conduct this assessment, doctrine does not provide a model for the integration of this product into existing planning doctrine to reach the desired effect. This desired effect is to provide the commander with accurate situational understanding to inform his decisions so that he understands the likely impacts of those decisions. Unless this process includes cultural assessment, it will be deficient in providing the commander with the information he needs.

Having answered these important questions, a secondary purpose of this chapter is to recommend possible models to facilitate the integration of cultural assessments into joint planning. The recommendations that follow are provided to begin the discussion on possible models to correct the deficiencies identified in this paper.

Recommendations

Current doctrine exhibits many strengths and the recommendations here are simply offered to strengthen it further. As much as possible, the recommendations attempt to work within the existing framework of joint doctrine and do not represent any radical changes to existing

doctrine. The goal of this approach is to begin the process of integrating cultural assessments without “throwing the baby out with the bath water.”

A New Model for JIPB

While written specifically for urban operations, the RAND publication, *Street Smart, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations* provides a framework for analysis that can have broader application to campaign planning. This model widens the scope of intelligence analysis to determine much more than adversary courses of action. The tools recommended in this work, in addition to ones already provided in Intelligence, Civil Affairs, and PSYOPS doctrine, can aid the analyst and planner in further defining distinguishing cultural characteristics of different population groups and their likely reactions to US military courses of action. The framework provided in *Street Smart* begins to address some of the deficiencies noted above in the doctrine chapter by addressing more than “blue vs. red” in COA development. This discussion of IPB can be elevated from strict applicability in an urban environment to the campaign planning level, which may include numerous urban environments. This new approach to IPB, added to the cultural assessment models provided, begins to move doctrine closer to addressing reality in a complex environment.

Cultural Assessment Models

The cultural assessment models provided in Chapter 5 are recommended for techniques when conducting cultural assessment. They prescribe a thorough analysis of demographic elements (analysis) to determine the dominant elements that shape the beliefs, values, and attitudes of population groups (synthesis) in a given area of operations. Once the broad cultural norms of a population group are determined, friendly and enemy courses of action should be examined to determine likely population group courses of action (judgment). The “Predictive Cultural Analysis” model provided above is a technique for integrating these cultural assessments

into the campaign planning process. While this process undoubtedly adds complexity to the planning process, it comes closer to determining the true nature of the conflict and providing the commander with more accurate situational understanding.

Civil Information Requirements

The discussion of a potential new CCIR subset in Chapter 5 deserves important consideration for inclusion into Joint doctrine. In addition to the extant PIR and FFIR, planners and leaders should consider CIR as well. This technique elevates the products of cultural assessments to the commander's attention for consideration. They identify gaps in cultural analysis and provide the commander critical civil information requirements for decisions. As demonstrated throughout this monograph, modern warfare is a complex undertaking, and in the effort to provide the commander accurate situational understanding, CIR reminds leaders and planners that the nature of the conflict they are preparing for may be more complex than "blue versus red." If the nature of the campaign includes, for example, numerous heavily populated urban areas with culturally distinct population groups throughout the area of operations, civil courses of action can have a direct influence on achieving strategic endstates of a campaign.

Summary

The integration of cultural assessments into campaign planning continues to be a challenge for the US military. History and theory, as documented here, indicate that culture has been and will continue to be an important factor in military operations. Joint operational doctrine addresses this phenomenon in isolated instances, but does not sufficiently address cultural considerations in campaign or operational planning, nor does it include a model for conducting cultural assessments or for integrating cultural assessments into the planning process. The goal of this monograph was to demonstrate these realities, and additionally to offer possible solutions to begin to frame the discussion on this topic. The simplistic models provided are merely the

starting point for further discussion on these important issues. These models provide techniques to conduct cultural assessments, and then integrate the results of those assessments into the campaign planning process. The result of this integration will provide the commander with a more accurate situational understanding and support key decisions during the execution of the campaign.

Consider the following quotation from a battalion commander in the 3d Infantry Division returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom:

I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. I knew where every enemy tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-47s and RPGs. Great technical intelligence. Wrong enemy.⁸⁷

The aim of this monograph was to identify and define this issue, begin the discussion, and provide possible starting points for future doctrine and TTP. By integrating a model of cultural assessment into the planning process, planners greatly increase their efficiency and effectiveness in achieving campaign objectives. Doctrine can continue to provide suggestions to “consider” culture, but until it is changed to reflect a specific requirement to integrate cultural assessment into the planning process, the same “lessons learned” regarding culture may continue to be documented from campaigns in the future.

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